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Abstract— Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is a 
continuous critical threat to the Internet. Derived from the low 
layers, new application-layer-based DDoS attacks utilizing 
legitimate HTTP requests to overwhelm victim resources are 
more undetectable. The case may be more serious when such 
attacks mimic or occur during the flash crowd event of a 
popular Website. In this paper, we present the design and 
implementation of CALD, an architectural extension to protect 
Web servers against various DDoS attacks that masquerade as 
flash crowds. CALD provides real-time detection using mess 
tests but is different from other systems that use resembling 
methods. First, CALD uses a front-end sensor to monitor the 
traffic that may contain various DDoS attacks or flash crowds. 
Intense pulse in the traffic means possible existence of 
anomalies because this is the basic property of DDoS attacks 
and flash crowds. Once abnormal traffic is identified, the 
sensor sends ATTENTION signal to activate the attack 
detection module. Second, CALD dynamically records the 
average frequency of each source IP and check the total mess 
extent. Theoretically, the mess extent of DDoS attacks is larger 
than the one of flash crowds. Thus, with some parameters from 
the attack detection module, the filter is capable of letting the 
legitimate requests through but the attack traffic stopped. 
Third, CALD may divide the security modules away from the 
Web servers. As a result, it keeps maximum performance on 
the kernel web services, regardless of the harassment from 
DDoS. In the experiments, the records from www.sina.com
and www.taobao.com have proved the value of CALD.
Keywords-DDoS; Application-layer; Kalman Filter;
Information Theory
1. INTRODUCTION (HEADING 1)
For many years, distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attack has caused severe damage to victims and still 
constitutes one of the major threats in current internet. A 
popular form of DDoS today is the application-layer floods 
that overwhelm the Web server with a large number of GET 
requests. To circumvent detection, the attackers increasingly 
move away from pure bandwidth floods to stealthy DDoS 
attacks that masquerade as flash crowds. The successful 
cases in the early history included MyDoom [1], Code Red 
[2] and FBI case involving DDoS-for-hire [3]. In recent 
years, we frequently heard the news and complaint about 
application-layer DDoS harassment [4-7]. In fact, the 
situation is much worse than we can expect because the 
botnet is booming. The China CCTV program ‘Economy 
Half Hour’ broadcast that the botnet has formed an industry 
chain and the capital concerned went beyond 10 billion 
Chinese Yuan in 2009 [8]. Although it is not just DDoS 
attacks that are associated with botnet, current DDoS attacks
are mainly launched by it. For an investigation into DDoS 
crime, the BBC program ‘Click’ brought a medium sized 
Website and demonstrated only 60 broadband connections 
were enough to make this Website unusable [9]. The experts 
in the TV show also said that the high-traffic sites were 
potential victims for application-layer DDoS attacks. The 
criminals got into contact with the Websites and threatened 
them in DDoS attacks. All kinds of high-traffic Websites that 
generate lots of revenue relied on the Websites to be online, 
so a lot of the Websites paid up to avoid the DDoS attacks.
Countering application-layer DDoS attack becomes a 
great challenge because they can be mounted with legitimate 
requests from legitimate connected machines. The requests 
originating from the compromised computer are 
indistinguishable from the requests generated by legitimate 
users. In fact, they differ from the legitimate ones only in 
intent but not in content. The malicious requests arrive from 
a large number of geographically distributed machines; thus 
they cannot be filtered on the IP prefix. Also, many Websites 
do not use passwords or login information, and even when 
they do, passwords could be easily stolen from the hard disk 
of a compromised machine. Further, checking the site-
specific password requires establishing a connection and 
allowing unauthenticated clients to access socket buffers and 
worker processes, making it easy to mount an attack on the 
authentication mechanism itself. Moreover, the method of 
using computational puzzles, which requires the clients to 
recognize a figure and submit the result, is not suitable 
sometimes because its demand of artificial engagement 
annoys people. Finally, in contrast to bandwidth attacks [11], 
it is difficult to detect big resources consumers when the 
attack targets higher-layer bottlenecks such as CPU, database 
and disk because commodity operating systems do not 
support fine-grained resource monitoring. Further, an 
attacker can resort to mutating attacks which cycle between 
different bottlenecks.
This paper proposes CALD, an architectural extension to 
protect Web servers against application-layer DDoS attacks 
that masquerade as flash crowds. It is targeted towards large-
scale online businesses as well as non-commercial portal 
Website. CALD combines three functions: abnormal traffic 
detection, DDoS attack detection, filter.
a) Abnormal traffic detection: The abnormal traffic 
detection is a real-time time series analyser. This function is 
deployed in the front-end sensor. According to our idea, the 
underlying assumption is that regular traffic behaviour is 
related to normal system use, or at least that only changes in 
any regular behaviour are interesting. Thus we aim to detect 
any abrupt change in the HTTP Get request traffic. The 
basic idea of this function is that once the modelling is done, 
the output of the model corresponds to normal system 
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behaviour, and the difference between observed behaviour 
and model output gives us the anomalous signature. We 
report this signature as a signal to DDoS attack detection 
component and diversify whether flash crowd or DDoS 
really happens. We have seen lots of successful application 
of such idea on network traffic analysis [12, 13]. In this 
paper, we drew AR model to describe and predict the Get 
request rate, and introduce the dynamical Kalman filter to 
calibrate the prediction result because of intensely 
fluctuation. In current status of our research, we only 
considered stationary AR model which could be extended to 
non-stationary process i.e. the even using Kalman filter for 
estimating time-dependent AR coefficients.
b) DDoS attack detection: when receives 
ATTENTION signal from front-end sensor, the DDoS 
attack detection component is activated. It traces each 
incoming source IP address as well as each visiting
Webpage, and records the average frequencies in a vector. 
In an intense traffic, the average frequency can be 
considered as the possibility of each source IP address. 
Based on the vector, this component calculates the entropy. 
The entropy called mess extent describes the distribution of 
incoming sources and target WebPages. We define the mess 
extent of source IP addresses as A, the mess extent of target 
WebPages as B and the rate between A and B as R. 
Theoretically, the variant R in flash crowd is smaller than 
the one in the application-layer DDoS attack. Thus, we are 
able to set several thresholds and pick out the anomalous 
source IP addresses.
c) Filter: when the abnormal traffic is justified as 
containing DDoS attack, the DDoS attack detection 
component sends the anomalous source IP addresses to filter 
so that it can release the flooding. Current application-layer 
DDoS attack is generally launched by more than 20,000 
compromised computers [14]. Implementing such a large 
list of IP addresses for block is not very easy. Simply 
searching method will definitely decrease the efficiency of 
the whole system. In this paper, we adopted Bloom Filter 
[15], where we implemented two hash functions inside and 
was capable of limiting the collision below sixteen ten-
thousandth.
Fig.1 summarizes CALD. It has a few important 
characteristics. Firstly, CALD addresses various application-
layer DDoS attack. Prior work usually has a bias against the 
Get request flooding the homepage. As will be described in 
section 2, CALD is concerned with three types of DDoS 
attacks; the latter is stealthier than the former. They are all 
easily achieved in the Internet and CALD can be capable of 
dealing with them. Next, the design of CALD draws 
essential properties against the application-layer DDoS 
attack. In the front-end sensor, the essential property is the 
large quantity of Get request from the attackers. In the DDoS 
detection model, the essential property is the difference in 
the rate of mess extents. No matter which type of DDoS is 
launched by the attackers, CALD is able to trace the attack. 
At last, CALD is simple. The simplicity in the algorithm 
increases the efficiency which is particular important in 
famous Website. CALD also divides the security modules 
away from the Web servers. As a result, it keeps maximum 
performance on the kernel web services, regardless of the 
harassment from DDoS. Even the update and deployment 
become more convenient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start by 
describing the three types of threat models in Section 2. 
Section 3 describes the details of CALD. More specially, 
here we analyse the essential properties of the application-
layer DDoS attacks and flash crowds. Section 4 elaborates 
the experiments. The last two sections are concerned with 
some discussion and related work about countering 
application-layer DDoS attacks.
2. THREAT MODEL
This paper mainly concerns with three types of 
application-layer DDoS, of which each one is stealthier than 
the former. (1) The attackers organize lots of compromised 
computer bombing the homepage of the Website, which we 
call as ‘repeated request DDoS’. MyDoom [1] and Code Red 
[2] all belong to the DDoS attack of this kind. (2) The 
attackers pick several premium pages out into a list and 
stochastically choose one as the target for each sending of 
the HTTP Get requests. Even this type of attack can perform 
like ‘Website Spider’ [10], which in an automated manner 
and orderly fashion browses the pages of the target Website. 
We have not seen any news or reports talking about such 
case happened in the wild as an application-layer DDoS 
attack. However, it is quite easy to be achieved and definitely 
hard to be tracked because the abnormal  traffic is leveraged 
into a group of targets and acts more like a legitimate 
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Figure 1: CALD Overview.
Note that DDoS Attack Detection component is only activated when front-end sensor reports ATTENTION signal.
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visiting. We call it ‘recursive request DDoS’. (3) There may 
exist some large files like image or download resources in 
the Website. There may also contain some operations that 
are concerned with heavy workload like database search. The 
attacker sends Get request to aim at these resources. This 
‘repeated workload DDoS’ can be invoked at a lower request 
rate, thereby requiring less work from the attacker and 
making detection increasingly difficult.
3. THE DESIGN OF CALD
According to our idea, a front-end sensor is used to 
detect the abrupt change in the traffic. If abnormal traffic 
exists, the DDoS attack detection component will be 
activated and make advanced inspection for a decision. The 
DDoS traffic from the malicious IP addresses will be 
ultimately blocked and flash crowded continues. In this 
section, we will describe how the modeling is done for 
abnormal traffic detection, how the anomalies are 
diversified as DDoS or flash crowd, and how the DDoS 
traffic is filtered.
3.1 Abnormal Traffic Detection
The traffic we will target is a stream of successive HTTP 
Get requests. Traffic intensity measurement taken at fixed, 
discrete time intervals from a time series {yt}. The intense 
change in the value of measurement means possible 
existence of application-layer DDoS attacks or flash crowds. 
Therefore, at instant t, the difference between measured 
value yt and model output yt’ represents the abnormal 
constituent of the traffic. The abnormal constituent is called 
also the residual series or the model error, and is defined as 
dt = |yt - yt’|.
As an early stage of our work, we use the stationary AP 
(p) model for abnormal traffic detection. The model is 
defined as:
tkt
p
k
k
tt exay  
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
1
"       (1)
Here yt” is the prediction. xt is the observation at instant t. 
atk are the stationary model parameter, and et is observation 
error. In other words, the model uses a weighted sum of p 
previous values to estimate the current observation value, the 
weights being the AR coefficients atk, k=1...p. The 
stationarity means that the weights atk are time independent. 
The idea is that normal system usage causes sufficiently 
regular and smooth traffic, that the current value can be 
predicted as a linear combination of p past values. The part 
of the traffic behaviour that cannot be predicted in this 
fashion is sufficiently anomalous to be reported to the next 
component. In current stage of design, we use stationary AR 
model, which means the parameters will not adapt to 
changes of the monitored traffic. We simply assign atk to be 
2-k and the sum of the atk is equal to 1. In the future research, 
we will extend this component. The model degree p needs to 
be defined. However, its value depends strongly on the type 
of Websites. We will discuss it in the Section 4.2 with the 
experimental setting.
The interval is 1 second and the sensor counts the HTTP 
Get requests during the interval. Based on the previous p 
records, the AR model calculates the prediction yt” for the 
next step. We need to calibrate the yt” because of intense 
fluctuation in the network traffic. We fetch the deviation dt
between calibrated value yt’ and realistic measured value to 
make decisions. Fig. 2 describes an episode of the HTTP Get 
requests on April 10th 2010. We considered the cases in both 
Fig. 2A and Fig. 2B as normal traffic. However, if we set the 
threshold of abnormal traffic decision to be a little small for 
more sensitivity, the fluctuation will greatly noise the 
prediction as we see in Fig. 2C and Fig. 2D.
Therefore, we need to calibrate the value after prediction. 
Kalman filter is an adaptive and recursive data processing 
algorithm that is suited for on-line estimation. Its essence is 
to compute the covariance and make a calibration between 
the measured value and observed value. Filtering can be seen 
as a process when a new observation arrives. The prediction 
and measurement equations can be put in vector form:
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For representing the Kalman filter equations, we use Xt|t-1
to denote the estimated value at time t using observations 
accumulated at instant t - 1. In addition, we use Ct to denote 
the covariance at time t. Now the Kalman filter equations for 
calibrating the prediction are:
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Among the equations, we fetch previous p values of x 
and initial the covariance C0 as:
Tpppp yavgXyavgXC ))())((( 11110     (11)
And the one-step calibration result will be (12). As an 
example, Fig. 2E and Fig. 2F depict a 2-steps calibration.
ttt xy |'     (12)
Fig. 2(E) and Fig. 2(F) depict an example of 2-steps 
calibration. Moreover, Kalman filter is a recursive algorithm 
that may bring a little delay. This is because of the N-steps 
recursion. Thus the total complexity for abnormal traffic 
detection is N*p. In fact, we have to use observations xt - xt+N
to estimate an improved prediction. The delay increases 
when N is enlarged and the accuracy inversely decreases. 
Therefore it should be chosen for a desired balance between 
prediction accuracy and suitable delay. We will discuss this
value in Section 4.2 and 4.3.
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3.2 Attack Inspection
3.2.1 Activate & Stop DDoS Detection Component
When the abnormal traffic is detected, the front-end 
sensor will send ATTENTION signal to the DDoS attack 
detection component and activate this component. This 
means the DDoS attack detection does not work for the 
whole traffic. It only runs when abnormal traffic arrives. In 
correspondence, when the front-end sensor finds the traffic 
has changed back to normal series, it will send DISMISS 
signal to the DDoS attack detection component and stop its 
work. To achieve above functions, we aggressively choose 
the threshold for abnormal traffic as:
2
dt kd      (13)
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After Kalman filter smoothes the deviations, the value k 
in (13) becomes the only parameter to adjust the sensitivity 
for activating the DDoS attack detection. This is another 
balance value because smaller value k will bring more 
sensitivity. We will discuss this value in Section 4.2.
3.2.2 Properties of DDoS Attacks and Flash Crowds
In this subsection, we will analyse the basic properties of 
application-layer DDoS attacks and flash crowds so that no 
matter what stealth mechanisms the attackers adopt, the 
detection cannot be circumvented. As is mentioned in the 
Section 2, our work is concerned with three types of attacks. 
During the analysis on real dataset of www.taobao.com
and www.sina.com, we noticed that:
	 Repeated Request DDoS: this type of attack mainly 
focuses on the homepage or a hot Webpage, so the 
targets of the traffic converge to one or two point. 
We also suppose the attack is launched by a certain 
quantity of bots. Thus the sources of the traffic 
converge to a group of points.
	 Recursive Request DDoS: this type of attack has a 
character that the traffic is scattered into different 
WebPages. As a result, the sources of the traffic 
converge to a group of points but the targets of the 
traffic become dispersed in some extent.
	 Repeated Workload DDoS: this type of attack is able 
to use less bots but even larger damage to the 
Website. However, the traffic will be similar to the 
case of ‘repeated request DDoS’. A group of bots 
continually sends requests for a large image or 
database searching operations.
	 Flash Crowd: an unexpected surge in visitors to a 
Web site, which is typically because of some 
newsworthy event that just took place. It may also be 
due to the announcement of a new service or free 
software download. The sources of flash crowds are 
definitely scattered because they are legitimate 
HTTP Get requests and from legitimate users. 
Conversely, the targets of flash crowds converge to 
one or two points because the visitors are mainly 
interested in one Webpage or resource, which 
comply with the definition of flash crowd.
3.2.3 Distinguish DDoS Attacks and Flash Crowds
Because the dispersion extent of the application-layer 
DDoS attacks and flash crowds are different in their targets 
and sources, we are able to use this basic property to 
distinguish them. However, such a statistical resembling 
method sounds intractable in real-time process as the 
statistical algorithms generally have great complexity in 
both space and time. In CALD, we firstly introduce a 
recursive method to calculate the possibilities for each 
sources and targets:
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Figure 2. Normal Traffic Example and Abnormal Traffic Detection.
Note that this paper uses Kalman Filter to calibrate the deviation so that the fluctuation in the normal traffic will not noise the 
abnormal traffic detection.
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According to equations (15) and (16), two dynamic 
vectors should be implemented in DDoS detection 
component. When a new HTTP Get request arrives, CALD 
will compute the time difference between the two arrival 
times and update the average frequencies in the source and 
target vectors. Particularly, we identify each target Webpage 
and source with special serial number so that searching the 
position for updating or inserting will not cost too much 
CPU time. The complexity extent of the whole algorithm 
keeps in O(3), which is acceptable for the efficiency of 
CALD.
In an intense traffic, we simply consider average 
frequency as the possibility. To describe the dispersion 
extent of the application-layer DDoS attacks and flash 
crowds, here we introduce the concrete measurement:
Definition (Mess Extent): suppose there is a set {n}, if 
the elements in set {n} are positioned dispersedly, then the 
Mess Extent is higher. Otherwise, if the elements in set {n} 
are converged in some points by any organized form, the 
Mess Extent is lower and close to 0.
In CALD, the different mess extents of the sources’ or 
targets’ possibilities are capable of describing the right 
distribution of attackers and targets. In fact, the mess extent 
denotes the distribution of contained information. This is 
essentially equivalent to the related concept in information 
theory. More concretely, CALD periodically calculates the 
mess extent of a vector using Shannon formula:
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According to the analysis in Section 3.2.2, we can use the 
rate of mess extents between sources and targets to 
distinguish various application-layer DDoS attacks and flash 
crowds. We deduce the following conclusion (S is source 
vector; T is target vector; ‘repeated request DDoS’ as 1; 
‘recursive request DDoS’ as 2; ‘repeated workload DDoS’ 
as 3 and flash crowd as 4):
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In CALD, the DDoS detection component implements 
two thresholds, one for mess extent calculation period and 
another for the boundary between DDoS attack and flash 
crowd. We put the details of the former in Section 4.3 and 
the latter in Section 4.2. When the DDoS detection 
component finds a real-time rate fallen in the range DDoS 
attack, it will post the source IPs, which has a higher 
frequency, to the filter component.
3.3 Filters
When the DDoS detection component has made a 
decision that current traffic contains application-layer DDoS 
attack, the DDoS detection component will set the 
parameters of the filter for blocking the HTTP Get requests 
from those malicious IP addresses. In fact, current 
application-layer DDoS attacks are mainly launched from 
botnet, there is a tendency that the quantity of bots concerned 
in the DDoS attack becomes larger and larger [14] that the 
number may reach more than 20,000. As described in 
Section 3.2(c), we simply choose the source IP addresses that 
emerges more than Q times (we set Q = 10 in CALD) in 1 
second interval. However, it is not an easy task to implement 
such a list which more than 20,000 malicious IP addresses. 
We are able to find some related work in the technologies of 
network routers for packets relaying [16, 17]. However, 
routers only need to look up the prefix of an IP address based 
on mask code. When the cases come to the filter component 
of CALD, the looks-up should cover the whole IP address.
To avoid the filter becoming a bottleneck of the whole 
system, CALD similarly adopted Bloom Filter [15] as the 
basic IP looks-up and update technology. An empty Bloom 
Filter is a bit array of m bits, all set to 0. There must also be 
k different hash functions defined, each of which maps or 
hashes some set element to one of the m array positions with 
a uniform random distribution. Here CALD implements two 
hash functions inside (k = 2) and the length of the bit array m 
is set to be 220. Suppose the IP address is in dotted decimal 
notation ‘A.B.C.D’, and then the hash functions are:
Hash function 1:
203333 2mod)( DCBA      (19)
Hash function 2:
202mod)***( DCBA     (20)
To add an element, feed the IP address to each of the two 
hash functions to get two array positions. Set the bits at all 
these positions to 1. To query for an element (test the IP 
address is in the set), feed it to each of the two hash functions 
to get two array positions. If any of the bits at these positions 
are 0, the IP address is not in the set. The reason is if it were, 
then all the bits would have been set to 1 when it was 
inserted. If all are 1, then either the IP address is in the set, or 
the bits have been set to 1 during the inserting of other IP 
addresses. The latter situation is called collision. Because we 
set the filter with two hash functions, the length of hash table 
is 220 and estimated quantity of malicious IP addresses is 
20,000, the collision possibility CP becomes:
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For CALD, the CP of sixteen ten-thousandth is not very 
big and the number of 220 bits means 128KB memory is 
needed for hash table.
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
4.1 Experiment Environment
Fig. 3 illustrates the key component of CALD. Our 
design allows different components assembled in different 
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computers so that the functions of CALD will not affect the 
process of Website. However, in our experiment, we simply 
integrated various components together with the Web server. 
The computer for experiment was a standard 3GHz double 
kernels Pentium IV machine with 4GB memory and running 
window vista. We also implemented a discrete time series 
producer which replayed each HTTP Get request 
of www.sina.com in April 10th. These HTTP Get requests 
were collected from the backbone of China Southwest. The 
population concerned was more than 300 million. The 
bandwidth of the backbone was 40GB. Under current 
condition of technologies, we were able to collect the 
requests in 10GB wherein 2GB for management. Therefore 
the rate for collection was one fifth. As CALD never cares 
about the sequence of HTTP Get requests, such rough data is 
enough for the analysis. We believe this character is right an 
advantage against the work of [20-23, 26], because 
sometimes we can hardly gather the exact HTTP Get request 
series.
4.2 Sensitivity and Modular Delay
There are two aspects that may influence the 
performance of CALD: system sensitivity and modular 
delay. System sensitivity decides the ability to detect the 
application-layer DDoS attacks and modular delay decides 
the time for CALD to detect the attacks. There are three 
parameters which may affect these two kinds of 
performances. 
The first one is the parameter p of AR model. The 
traditional assignment on parameter p should is directed by 
parameter estimation [27], which is not suitable to be 
dynamically used in CALD. As will be discussed in Section 
6, CALD does not need accurate model for tracing the 
traffic. In fact, in current version, we set the parameter atk as 
{2-k}, so when k becomes larger, the effect becomes less, 
even nearly no effect on AR model. Fig. 4 shows an episode
of application-layer DDoS attack from www.sina.com in 
April 10th 2010. Fig. 4 also describes a flash crowd which 
happened in the same day.  Fig. 5 shows the corresponding 
prediction when we set p as 5.
The second one is the lag of Kalman filter. Larger lag 
brings more sensitivity as long as larger delay for DDoS 
attacks detection. Fig. 6 shows 1-step to 3-steps calibrations 
which will bring 1 second to 3 seconds delay respectively. In 
the figures, we noticed a strange phenomenon that 2-steps 
calibration performance better among the three. The 3-steps 
calibration rebounded to be more serrated in the amplitude of 
deviations. We will find the reason in the future work. 
The third one is the boundary for distinguishing the 
attacks and flash crowds. Setting this threshold will also 
affect both the sensitivity and modular delay. In current 
work, we have not found any reasonable methods to decide 
the most suitable value for this boundary. We simply 
assigned it as 0.7 and successfully detected the DDoS attack 
of www.sina.com in the seventh second after five seconds 
for AR model report abnormal traffic and 2 seconds for 
calculation period of mess extent. CALD never triggered the 
block of source IPs against flash crowds.
5. RELATED WORK
Jaeyeon Jung and his collaborators [18] studied the 
properties of both application-layer DDoS attack and flash 
crowd with a special attention to characteristics that might 
distinguish the two. Identifying these characteristics allowed 
a formulation of a strategy for Websites to quickly discard 
malicious requests. However, as we can say, some of the 
declared characteristics are a series of phenomenon, not the 
essential properties.  The attackers were capable of avoiding 
this appearance by simply adjusting attack scheme. 
CAPTCHA [19] and later another improved version by 
Scrianth Kandula, etc [20], almost perfectly solved the 
application-layer DDoS, even the flash crowds, but this 
method basically required the engagement of clients to 
recognize a puzzle figure and input the result for an 
authentication. Supranamaya Ranjan et al. [21] proposed a 
counter-mechanism that consists of a suspicion assignment 
mechanism and a DDoS-resilient scheduler. The former 
assigned a suspicion measure to a session in proportion to its 
deviation from legitimate behaviour and used the latter to 
decide whether and when the session is serviced. According 
to their experiments, the victims’ performance could be 
improved from 40 seconds to 1.5 seconds. However, we 
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think DDoS Shield introduced in this paper had a drawback 
that their method could not actively block the malicious 
traffic. It only released the symptom of being attacked 
victims.
In recent two years, Dr. Yi Xie adopted Hidden Semi-
Markov model for the detection of application-layer DDoS 
attack. His method recorded the current user visiting 
sequences and calculated the diversities in possibilities of the 
sequences. The biggest problem of Hidden Semi-Markov 
method was the algorithm complexity. Although Dr. Yi Xie 
improved this drawback based on M-algorithm in [22] and 
independent component analysis in [23], we still found that 
tracking each user’s visiting sequence was not a practical 
task. Georgios Oikonomou and Jelena Mirkovic [14] 
proposed defences against application-layer DDoS attacks 
via human behaviour modelling which differentiate DDoS 
bots from human users. Their method was achieved through 
three aspects: request dynamics, request semantics and 
ability to process visual cues. We found their work had 
several limitations. For instance, they tried to build a 
possibility graph for a Website, but as we can say, for most 
large Websites such as www.taobao.com, with too many 
dynamical Webpages inside, they can hardly finish the 
construction.
There are still other related works about detecting 
application-layer DDoS attacks. Simon Byers et.al [24] 
discussed the dangers that scalable Internet functionality may 
present to the real world. Their work focused upon an attack 
that is simple, yet could have great impact, which they 
believed might occur quite soon. This paper is an early 
published prospective work about application-layer DDoS 
attacks. Paul Barford et.al [25] used wavelet to distinguish 
the flash crowds and DDoS attacks. However, the method of 
using wavelet was only a post-mortem technology. Takeshi 
Yatagai et.al [26] proposed HTTP Get flooding detection 
techniques based on analysis of page access behaviour. They 
proposed two detection algorithms, one is focusing on a 
browsing order of pages and the other is focusing on a 
correlation with browsing time to page information size. We 
think the drawback of their work was somewhat the same 
with Dr. Yi Xie‘s and Jaeyeon Jung’s, because the properties 
for detection could easily be circumvented by simply 
modifying the attack schemes.
6. DISCUSSION
It could be argued that AR model is too limited for 
modelling the type of HTTP Get traffic. For example, errors 
on rapid changes in observations are one manifestation of the 
AR model’s limitations and non-linear models, for example, 
could provide better reactivity to rapid changes. We have 
three reasons to stay with linear models for front-end 
abnormal traffic detection: (1) given our underlying idea we 
do not even want to model the traffic exactly, especially the 
rapid changes should be left out of the model. We only pay 
attention to the amplitude of the changes. (2) Through the 
smoothing function by N-steps Kalman filter, the noise of 
rapid changes will be mitigated and the calibrated prediction 
is able to improve the accuracy. (3)Simple models mean 
simpler algorithms and this translates to faster and lighter 
implementations, which is an important consideration for 
deploying the method.
There is another methodological point which easily 
incurs argument. It also derives from the AR linear model. 
When the attackers slowly increase the abnormal traffic, they 
are able to circumvent the abnormal traffic detection. This is 
the key weakness of linear prediction model resembling 
machine learning technologies. In current version of CALD, 
in fact, we set a threshold inside. When the real-time traffic 
rises beyond that threshold, no matter whether abnormal 
traffic detection function is aware of the anomalies, the front-
end will report the ATTENTION and activate the next DDoS 
detection component as well. However, if we induce the 
traffic of import as well as export, CALD will become 
capable of defending such slowly increasing DDoS attack. 
We will improve the CALD in the next stage of our work.
Third, CALD has a few parameters that we have assigned 
values based on experience. For example, we set the AR 
model parameter p to be 5 in the experiments. There is 
nothing special about 5, we only need a value that is neither 
too big nor too small. In fact, the prediction could become 
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more long-effecting if we set p a bit larger. Similarly, we set 
the mess extent of flash crowds to be under 20. There is also 
nothing special about this threshold, we just get it according 
to our experience by analysing the past records of 
application-layer DDoS attacks.
Fourth, the filter component needs to be flushed 
eventually since compromised zombies may turn into 
legitimate clients. The filter can be cleaned either by 
resetting all entries simultaneously or by decrementing the 
various entries at a particular rate. In the next stage of our 
work, we will implement such functions in CALD.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented an approach for 
countering application-layer DDoS attack that mimics the 
normal users’ behaviours. The basic assumptions are: (1) 
abrupt changes in the traffic mean a possible existence of 
abnormal traffic; (2) the mess extent of various DDoS 
attacks is larger than the one of flash crowds. Based on the 
first point, we introduce a front-end sensor to detect the 
abnormal traffic and report its existence when abnormal 
traffic arrives. The second component which is used for 
distinguish DDoS attack and flash crowd is activated or 
stopped by the signal ATTENTION or DISMISS from the 
front-end sensor. With parameters of malicious IP addresses, 
the filter blocks the abnormal traffic and leaves the Website 
to be safe. The analysis and experiments show that CALD 
perform well in countering various application-layer DDoS 
attacks and the delay for detection is kept in a range of N 
seconds.
This paper presents an early stage of our work. In the 
future, we will extend the work in the following aspects: (1) 
improve the stationary AR to be time-varying model where 
the parameters will denote the changes of the system status; 
(2) as is discussed in Section 6, CALD is not sensitive to the 
slowly increasing DDoS attack. Thus we may consider both 
the output and input traffic to deal with this situation.
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